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PREFACE 
One of the tasks of the System and Decision Sciences Area in 1976 has 
been the investigation of problems in "fair division". In a general sense, the 
problem is how to divide and distribute various goods (or bads) equitably 
among competing agents in a system. A particularly important aspect of 
this question is the institutions through which distributional decisions are 
made. In particular. what are the consequences of different divisions of 
decision-making powers? This paper addresses the problem of measuring 
the relative effectiveness of agents in organizations where decisions are taken 
by vote. The results have application to  the estimation of inequalities in, 
and the equity of. various distributions of decision-making authority. 

SUMMARY 
One of the important aspects of the structure of decision-making 
institutions is the implication this structure has for the interdependencies 
among agents and their relative abilities to  influence choices and outcomes, 
i.e. their "effectiveness". Various measures of interdependency and effec- 
tiveness have been proposed. notably by Shapley and Shubik, Ranzhaf, and 
Coleman. In this paper a new approach is obtained by proposing a kind of 
"currency" in which structural influence can be traded; this enables one to  
apply economic concepts and show that in general a trading equilibrium 
exists whose properties have a natural interpretation for ~neasurir~g the 
relative effectiveness of the various decisiorl-making agents. 

The "value" or "worlh" of a man is, as of  all other 
things, his price, that is lo say, so much as would be 
given for Lhe use of his power. 
Thomas Hobbes 
Leviathan, Pt. I, Ch. 10 

Power, P r i c e s ,  and Incomes 
I n  Vot ing Systems 
INTRODUCTION 
The b r i b i n g  o f  l e g i s l a t u r e s  and o t h e r  decis ion-making b o d i e s  
f o r  t h e  f u r t h e r a n c e  o f  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t s  h a s  a  long  h i s t o r y  t h a t  
d o u b t l e s s  h a s  n o t  ceased  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  day.  One o f  t h e  most no- 
t o r i o u s  a l l e g e d  c a s e s  o f  b r i b e r y  was r e p o r t e d  by t h e  Scotsman 
George Lockhar t  i n  h i s  Memoirs o f  t h e  A f f a i r s  o f  S c o t l a n d  [4]  . 
Lockhar t  charged  t h a t  t h e  T r e a t y  o f  Union, which c r e a t e d  G r e a t  
B r i t a i n  i n  1707, was ach ieved  by t h e  Q u e e n ' s  M i n i s t e r  s e l e c t i v e l y  
b r i b i n g  members of t h e  S c o t t i s h  P a r l i a m e n t .  The most a s t o n i s h i n g  
a s p e c t  o f  L o c k h a r t ' s  a c c o u n t  i s  t h a t  he  p u b l i s h e d ,  i n  1714, a  
l i s t  of  t h e  members b r i b e d  and t h e  p r i c e s  p a i d .  The l i s t  c o n t a i n s  
32 names, i n c l u d i n g  t h e  Duke of  Queensberry,  who a l l e g e d l y  g o t  
£12325 0 s  Od, t h e  E a r l  of  Marchrnont £1104 1 5 s  7d, t h e  Marquis 
o f  Tweeddale £1000 0 s  Od, and s o  o n ,  t h e  lowes t  man go ing  f o r  
E l l  2s  Od. A l l  of  t h o s e  a l l e g e d l y  b r i b e d  e x c e p t  one ( t h e  Duke 
o f  A t h o l l )  v o t e d  f o r  t h e  Union. Lockhar t  c o n c l u d e s  b i t t e r l y ,  " I t  
i s  abundant ly  d i s g r a c e f u l  t o  be ... a  c o n t r i b u t o r  t o  t h e  mise ry  and 
r u i n  o f  o n e ' s  n a t i v e  c o u n t r y ;  b u t  f o r  p e r s o n s  of q u a l i t y  and d i s -  
t i n c t i o n  t o  se l l ,  and even a t  s o  mean a  p r i c e ,  themse lves  and 
t h e i r  p o s t e r i t y  i s  s o  scanda lous  and infamous,  t h a t  such  p e r s o n s  
must be c o n t e m p t i b l e  i n  t h e  s i g h t  o f  t h o s e  t h a t  bought  t h e m . . . " .  
Whether L o c k h a r t ' s  numbers a r e  a c c u r a t e  o r  n o t ,  t h e y  provoke 
a  g e n e r a l  q u e s t i o n :  i n  t h e  b r i b i n g  o f  l e g i s l a t u r e s  o r  o t h e r  v o t i n g  
b o d i e s  where d i f f e r e n t  members have d i f f e r e n t  d e g r e e s  o f  i n f l u -  
e n c e ,  what p r i c e s  w i l l  t h e  v a r i o u s  members command? The answer  
would a p p e a r  t o  depend on two f a c t o r s :  t h e  minimum p r i c e  a  v o t e r  
i s  w i l l i n g  t o  a c c e p t  under  any c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  and h i s  "wor th"  t o  
t h e  one  who is buying h i s  i n f l u e n c e  ( i . e . ,  h i s  p o w e r ) .  
I n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  v a r i o u s  n u m e r i c a l  measures  o f  power have 
been p r o p o s e d - -  n o t a b l y ,  t h o s e  o f  Shapley-Shubik [8], Banzhaf [ I ]  
and Coleman [3]. Each o f  t h e s e  measures  i s  u l t i m a t e l y  b a s e d  on 
t h e  i d e a  t h a t  a  v o t e r  i s  power fu l  i n s o f a r  a s  he  can  change t h e  
outcome by chang ing  h i s  v o t e .  The view we s h a l l  t a k e  h e r e  is t h a t  
it is  n o t  enough t h a t  a  v o t e r  be a b l e  t o  change t h e  outcome: h e  
must have an i n c e n t i v e  t o  d o  s o .  Thus,  i f  we a r e  a b l e  t o  i d e n t i f y  
t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e s  t h a t  a  l o b b y i s t ,  f o r  example,  would pay f o r  
t h e  members' v o t e s ,  we would have a  measure o f  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  power 
i n  t h e  Hobbesian s e n s e .  I n  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n s  we s h a l l  d e v e l o p  a  
c o n c e p t  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e s  and incomes f o r  a r b i t r a r y  v o t i n g  
games, and compare t h e  r e s u l t s  w i t h  t h e  Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf 
measures .  
VOTING GAMES 
A s i m p l e  game,  o r  i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t ,  a  v o t i n g  game G = (N,S) , 
i s  a f i n i t e  s e t  N o f  p l a y e r s ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  a  c o l l e c t i o n  S o f  sub-  
s e t s  o f  N c a l l e d  w i n n i n g  c o a l i t i o n s  which s a t i s f y  
a z s ,  
( 1 )  
S E S  and S C T + T E S  . 
The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  G i s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :  i f  S  i s  p r e c i s e l y  
t h e  s e t  o f  p l a y e r s  v o t i n g  f o r  a g i v e n  measure ,  t h e n  t h e  measure 
w i l l  p a s s  i f  and o n l y  i f  S  E S.  The p a i r  ( i , S )  i s  c r i t i c a l  i f  
i E S  E S and S  - { i }  X ' S .  Where c i  ( G )  d e n o t e s  t h e  number o f  c r i t i c a l  
p a i r s  c o n t a i n i n g  i ,  t h e  Banzhaf  power [ I ]  of  p l a y e r  i i s  d e f i n e d  
t o  be  
i . e . ,  t h e  r e l a t i v e  number o f  t i m e s  p l a y e r  i i s  c r i t i c a l .  I n  pa r -  
t i c u l a r ,  i f  a  p l a y e r  i s  never  c r i t i c a l  t h e n  h e  has  no power ( such  
a  p l a y e r  i s  c a l l e d  a  dummy) .  While t h i s  seems n a t u r a l ,  t h e r e  
seems t o  b e  no immediate r e a s o n  f o r  a s s e r t i n g  i n  g e n e r a l  t h a t  a  
p l a y e r ' s  power i s  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  t h e  number o f  t i m e s  h e  is  c r i t -  
i c a l .  F i r s t ,  i n  any g i v e n  s i t u a t i o n  s e v e r a l  p l a y e r s  may be  c r i t -  
i c a l ,  hence n o  one o f  them h a s  u n i l a t e r a l  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  outcome. 
Second,  t h e r e  is  no a p p a r e n t  i n c e n t i v e  f o r  a  p l a y e r  i n  a  winning 
c o a l i t i o n  t o  change h i s  v o t e  and make t h e  measure f a i l  ( u n l e s s  we 
suppose  t h a t  e a c h  v o t e r ' s  o b j e c t i v e  i s  mere ly  t h e  c a p r i c i o u s  de- 
m o n s t r a t i o n  o f  h i s  i n f l u e n c e ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  of h i s  a c t u a l  p r e f e r -  
e n c e s ) .  The Coleman measures  of  power [3 ]  a r e  s i m i l a r  t o  Banzhaf ' s  
b u t  t h e y  make a  d i s t i n c t i o n  between t h e  power t o  p a s s  a  measure 
and t h e  power t o  b l o c k  i t ,  a  v a l u a b l e  d i s t i n c t i o n  t h a t  w i l l  be 
d i s c u s s e d  l a t e r  on .  
The Shapley-Shubik measure may be  d e f i n e d  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
way. L e t  a l l  t h e  p l a y e r s  l i n e  up i n  a  row i l , i  2,... ,in ( a l l  o r -  
d e r i n g ~  b e i n g  e q u i p r o b a b l e ) .  P l a y e r  ik is p i v o t a l  i f  k  is t h e  
f i r s t  i n d e x  f o r  which { i l , i  2 , . . . , i k }  E S.  Thus t h e  p i v o t a l  p l a y e r  
i s  t h e  one who p u t a t i v e l y  g e t s  c r e d i t  f o r  hav ing  p a s s e d  t h e  measure.  
The P h a p l e y - S h u b i k  power of  p l a y e r  i ,  a i ( G ) ,  i s  d e f i n e d  t o  be t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  i i s  p i v o t a l .  
The Shapley-Shubik v a l u e  is a  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e  o f  a  more gen- 
e r a l  v a l u e  d e f i n e d  by Shap ley  [ 7 ]  f o r  s i m p l e  games. For  a  more 
d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s i o n  of  t h e  v a r i o u s  measures  and t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  
see Brams [ 2 ]  and Lucas [ 5 ] .  
EQUILIBRIUM PRICES 
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  we i n t r o d u c e  a  model o f  p o l i t i c a l  power i n  
which t h e  p l a y e r s  r e c e i v e  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  t h e i r  power i n  t e r m s  of  
money payments.  To p a r a p h r a s e  Hobbes, t h e  power of  a  v o t e r  w i l l  
be  measured by t h e  amount someone would pay f o r  t h e  u s e  o f  it. 
W e  t h e r e f o r e  i n t r o d u c e  i n t o  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a r e n a  a  l o b b y i s t ,  who 
i s  assumed t o  have a  l a r g e  q u a n t i t y  o f  f u n d s  a t  h i s  d i s p o s a l .  W e  
s h a l l  f u r t h e r  assume t h a t  i n  t h e  g i v e n  v o t i n g  game G a  b i l l  ( o r  
s u c c e s s i o n  of  b i l l s )  i s  i n t r o d u c e d  t h a t  t h e  l o b b y i s t  wants  p a s s e d .  
The l o b b y i s t  d e s i r e s  s imply  t o  p a s s  t h e  b i l l s  a t  l e a s t  c o s t .  The 
o b j e c t i v e  o f  e a c h  p l a y e r  is  t o  maximize h i s  " b r i b e "  income. I n  
g e n e r a l  w e  may e x p e c t  t h a t  t h e  more power a  p l a y e r  h a s ,  t h e  h i g h e r  
t h e  p r i c e  h e  w i l l  command and t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  income h e  w i l l  r e -  
c e i v e .  The problem i s  t o  f i n d  t h e  p r i c e s  and incomes o f  t h e  v a r -  
i o u s  p l a y e r s .  
L e t  pi 2 0 b e  t h e  p r i c e  o f  p l a y e r  i ,  
 EN. p ( S )  = 1 p i i s  
iES 
t h e  c o s t  o f  b r i b i n g  t h e  s u b s e t  SGN. W e  s h a l l  assume t h a t  t h e  
l o b b y i s t  i s  a  " p r i c e - t a k e r " ,  t h a t  i s ,  t h e  p l a y e r s  announce t h e i r  
p r i c e s  p  and t h e n  t h e  l o b b y i s t  b r i b e s  some l e a s t - c o s t  winn ing  set  
- 
S.  A payment scheduZe f o r  t h e  l o b b y i s t  is  t h e r e f o r e  a  f u n c t i o n  f  
which f o r  any p r i c e  v e c t o r  p  g i v e s  a  set f ( p )  = S E  S s a t i s f y i n g  
- 
p ( S )  2 p ( S t )  f o r  a l l  S '  E S. 
- 
Given f ,  an n-person game i s  d e f i n e d  on t h e  s e t  N of  p l a y e r s  
i n  which each p l a y e r  i quo t e s  a  p r i c e  pi and g e t s  a  payoff  pi i f  
i s  f ( p ) ,  and z e r o  o the rw i se .  However, i n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  on ly  equi -  
- 
l i b r i u m  p r i c e s  p  f o r  such a  game r e s u l t  i n  b r i b e s  o f  z e r o .  Spe- 
- 
c i f i c a l l y ,  suppose t h e  unde r ly ing  v o t i n g  game (N,S) has  no v e t o  
p l a y e r ,  t h a t  i s ,  no p l a y e r  i who i s  i n  every  winning s e t .  Le t  p  
- 
be e q u i l i b r i u m  f o r  t h e  g iven  f ,  S* = f(?). I f  i i s  i n  e v e r y  min- 
imum c o s t  winning se t ,  t hen  i~ S* and i can r a i s e  h i s  p r i c e  by E 
and s t i l l  be c e r t a i n  of  be ing  b r i b e d ,  s o  t h a t  p  would n o t  be i n  
- 
e q u i l i b r i u m .  The re fo r e  f o r  every i E S* t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  minimum 
c o s t  winning set Si such t h a t  i t s i .  For any j E S .  i f  p .  > 0 
I' 1 
t h e n  j could  lower h i s  p r i c e  by E and be c e r t a i n  o f  be ing  b r i b e d .  
Hence p (S i )  = 0 ,  s o  p (S* )  = 0 ( s i n c e  it i s  a  minimum), showing t h a t  
- 
f o r  every  k E N k e i t h e r  i s  n o t  b r i b e d ,  o r  i s  b r i b e d  w i t h  a  p r i c e  
o f  ze ro .  
Such a  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  i s  u n r e a l i s t i c ,  however, because i n  
g e n e r a l  no p l a y e r  w i l l  a c c e p t  a r b i t r a r i l y  s ma l l  b r i b e s  - - i f  f o r  
no o t h e r  reason  t han  t h a t  a c c e p t i n g  b r i b e s  i nvo lve s  c e r t a i n  r i s k s ,  
n o t  t o  ment ion t ime  s p e n t  n e g o t i a t i n g ,  and s o  f o r t h .  Thus w e  s h a l l  
assume t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  p o s i t i v e  minimum p r i c e  pp ,  o r  f l o o r  p r i c e ,  
( a  datum of t h e  problem) t h a t  p l a y e r  i w i l l  a c c e p t  f o r  a  b r i b e .  
The p r i c e  v e c t o r  p  i s  s a i d  t o  be  f e a s i b l e  i f  p  2 ?'. 
- - 
When i s  p  i n  equ i l i b r i um?  Var ious  concep t s  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m  
- 
f o r  n-person games have been proposed.  A f e a s i b l e  p  i s  i n  "equi -  
-. 
l i b r i um"  i n  t h e  u sua l  s ense  i f  no p l a y e r  i can  change h i s  p r i c e  
and do b e t t e r .  More g e n e r a l l y ,  i f  no s e t  of p l a y e r s  can change 
t h e i r  p r i c e s  and e a c h  do b e t t e r ,  i . e . ,  i f  t h e r e  i s  no s e t  C C N ,  
C f @,  and f e a s i b l e  p '  such  t h a t  pi = p j  f o r  a l l  i # C ,  and 
p ; ' >  p j  f o r  a l l  j ~ C n f ( p )  - , 
t h e n  p  - i s  s a i d  t o  be i n  " s t r o n g  e q u i l i b r i u m "  [ 6 1 .  S t r o n g  e q u i -  
l i b r i a  a r e  v e r y  s p e c i a l ,  and few n-person games have  them. 
A n  even  s t r o n g e r  c o n c e p t  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m  r e s u l t s  i f  we sup-  
p o s e  t h a t  p l a y e r s  c o o p e r a t e  i n  naming t h e i r  p r i c e s  and  a g r e e  t o  
compensate  e a c h  o t h e r  a f t e r w a r d s .  
We s a y  t h a t  p 2 p0 i s  a  collective equilibrium ( f o r  a  g i v e n  
f )  i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  no s e t  C S N ,  C  # a ,  and f e a s i b l e  p r i c e s  p '  # p 
where p j  = pi f o r  a l l  i $ C ,  s u c h  t h a t  
(2  C C f ( p ' )  
and 
C ' s  c o l l e c t i v e  p a y o f f  can  be d i s t r i b u t e d  s u c h  t h a t  
e v e r y  p l a y e r  i n  C  r e c e i v e s  a t  l e a s t  h i s  minimum p r i c e  
and i s  s t r i c t l y  b e t t e r  o f f  t h a n  b e f o r e .  
Given ( 2 1 ,  t h e  l a t t e r  means t h a t  t h e r e  i s  some {diIiEC s a t i s f y i n g  
d .  = 1 p i ,  where di 2 pi > 0 f o r  a l l  ~ E C  and d i  > pi f o r  
~ E C  ~ E C  
a l l  i E C  n f  ( p )  - ; e q u i v a l e n t l y ,  
Every c o l l e c t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  a  s t r o n g  
e q u i l i b r i u m .  
Example 1 .  C o n s i d e r  t h e  v o t i n g  game on s e v e n  p l a y e r s  1 , 2 , 3 ,  
4 ,5 ,6 ,7  d e f i n e d  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f o u r  minimal  winn ing  sets:  
L e t  = 1  ( i - e . ,  a l l  p l a y e r s  have  e q u a l  f l o o r  p r i c e s )  and l e t  
- - 
f  b e  s u c h  t h a t  f  ( p )  = { I  , 2 1  whenever { 1 , 2  } i s  one  o f  s e v e r a l  
minimum c o s t  s e t s .  
C o n s i d e r  t h e  v e c t o r  p  = ( 3 , 2 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 )  . E v i d e n t l y  f  (e) = 
{ 1 , 2 1 ,  a n d  n o  p l a y e r s  can  ( f e a s i b l y )  lower  t h e i r  p r i c e s  and 
improve t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s ,  n o  m a t t e r  what  t h e  o t h e r  p l a y e r s  do.  
Suppose  on t h e  o t h e r  hand t h a t  C  i s  a  g r o u p  o f  p l a y e r s  e a c h  o f  
whom r a i s e s  h i s  p r i c e ,  and t h a t  e a c h  d o e s  b e t t e r  t h a n  b e f o r e .  
I f  t h e  new p r i c e  v e c t o r  i s  p ' ,  t h e n  t h i s  i m p l i e s  C C f ( p ' )  = T. 
- 
S i n c e  o n l y  t h e  p l a y e r s  i n  C  r a i s e  t h e i r  p r i c e s ,  a l l  o t h e r s  re- 
main ing  t h e  same, any minimum c o s t  winn ing  s e t  S  under  p must 
c o n t a i n  C ,  s i n c e  o t h e r w i s e  it would c o s t  less under  p'  t h a n  d o e s  
T. T h e r e f o r e  C  i s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  e v e r y  p-minimum c o s t  se t ;  b u t  t h e  
i n t e r s e c t i o n  of t h e s e  i s  empty. Thus  p i s  a  s t r o n g  e q u i l i b r i u m .  
W e  may i n  f a c t  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  p  i s  a  c o l l e c t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  ( a n d  
t h e  u n i q u e  o n e )  w i t h  t h e  h e l p  o f  a  r e s u l t  which f o l l o w s  Lemma 1 .  
F i r s t  we need  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  d e f i n i t i o n s .  W e  s a y  t h a t  P 2 p o  
is a  c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  f o r  f  i f  it i s  a  c o l l e c t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  
f o r  f  and pi  = p p  f o r  a l l  i # f ( p ) .  I n  o t h e r  words ,  a  c a n o n i c a l  
- 
e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  a  c o l l e c t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  which e v e r y  p l a y e r  who 
is  n o t  b r i b e d  i s  a t  h i s  f l o o r  p r i c e .  I n d e e d ,  a t  e q u i l i b r i u m  t h e r e  
c a n  b e  n o  a d v a n t a g e  f o r  a  n o n b r i b e d  p l a y e r  t o  q u o t e  more t h a n  h i s  
f l o o r  p r i c e ,  f o r  by q u o t i n g  h i s  f l o o r  p r i c e  h e  may a t  l e a s t  b e  com- 
p e t i t i v e  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  h e  c o u l d  b e  a  member o f  some l e a s t  c o s t  
w i n n i n g  set .  I n  f a c t ,  any c o l l e c t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  j u s t  a  canon- 
i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  which some p l a y e r s  who a r e  n o t  b r i b e d  q u o t e  
u n r e a l i s t i c a l l y  h i g h  p r i c e s  (Lemma 2 b e l o w ) .  
For  any g i v e n  f l o o r  p r i c e s  p 0  - > 0 d e f i n e  
S o  = {S c S : p 0  (S)  = min p 0  ( S ' )  1 
S'ES - 
The members of  S O  a r e  c a l l e d  c r i t i c a l  s e t s ,  and t h e  members 
o f  N O  t h e  c r i t i c a l  p l a y e r s .  
Lemma I .  A p r i c e  v e c t o r  p  is  a  c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  ( f o r  
- 
some f )  i f  and o n l y  i f  
( 4 )  p 2 p0  and pi = pl f o r  a l l  i k N O  
( 5  f o r  some S O  E S o ,  p ( S O )  2 p ( S )  f o r  a l l  s E S , 
( 6  1 pi is  maximum o v e r  a l l  p  s a t i s f y i n g  ( 4 )  and ( 5 ) .  
i E N O  
- 
N o t i c e  t h a t  " f o r  some" i n  ( 5 )  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  " f o r  e v e r y " ,  
g i v e n  ( 4 )  . 
Proof .  
L e t  p  be  any f e a s i b l e  p r i c e  v e c t o r  such  t h a t  f o r  some 
- 
( 7 )  p-minimum - c o s t  winn ing  s e t  T I  pi  = pi f o r  a l l  i $ T .  
We c l a i m  ( 4 )  h o l d s  and T  E S O .  
I n d e e d ,  f o r  any S E S,  
But f o r  any sOESO, p O ( ~ O )  - P O ( ~ )  - 1 D ( p i - p i )  ( 0 ,  hence by 
ieT-S 
t h e  above f o r  any S o  E S O ,  ? ' ( so )  = ? O ( T )  and pi = p ?  f o r  a l l  
~ E T - S O .  T h e r e f o r e  ( 4 )  h o l d s ,  and T E S ' .  
Now l e t  p be  a  c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  f o r  some f .  Then 
( 7 )  h o l d s  f o r  T  = f  ( p )  , hence p  s a t i s f i e s  ( 4 )  and ( 5 ) .  Suppose 
- - 
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  some o t h e r  p '  s a t i s f y i n g  ( 4 )  and ( 5 ) ,  s a y  S '  E S o  
- 
minimizes  p 1  ( S )  , and t h a t  1 p j  > 1 . . Let  
~ E N O  ~ E N O  
C = { i ~ N : p '  > P p ]  C N o ,  and d e f i n e  p l  = p f - E  f o r  a l l  i~ C and i 
p ?  = p j  = pp f o r  i # C .  F o r  s u f f i c i e n t l y  s m a l l  E > O  w e  have p" 
- 
f e a s i b l e ,  py = pi = p: f o r  a l l  i # N O ,  and 
moreover S '  minimizes  p " ( S )  o v e r  a l l  S E  S. 
- 
For  a n y  s e t  S* E S  minimizing p "  ( S )  we have 
- 
= [ p '  (S*)  - p 1 ( S ' ) 1  + I c -  S * I E  ) 0 ; 
- 4 
hence  C L S*,  and p l ( S * )  = p ' ( S 1 ) .  ~ u t  P '  d i f f e r s  from o n l y  
- - 
on C ,  and C L S * n S 1 ;  hence 
t h a t  i s ,  S* E S o .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r  f  (p" )  minimizes  p "  (S)  , s o  f  (p"  ) E S o ,  
- 
hence  N o  C f  - But t h e n  by ( 8 )  N O  i s  a  s u b s e t  c o l l e c t i v e l y  
b e t t e r  o f f  under  p "  t h a n  under  p ,  c o n t r a d i c t i n g  t h e  assumpt ion  
- - 
t h a t  p  i s  a  c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m .  
- 
Converse ly ,  l e t  p s a t i s f y  ( 4 )  - ( 6 )  ; i n  p a r t i c u l a r  S O  mini -  
mizes  p ( S )  f o r  e v e r y  S o  E S o .  Le t  f  be  a n y  payment s c h e d u l e  s u c h  
t h a t  f ( p )  = S* E S o .  Suppose,  by way o f  c o n t r a d i c t i o n ,  t h a t  p i s  
- 
- 
n o t  a c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  f o r  t h i s  f .  Then t h e r e  i s  a nonempty 
s u b s e t  C of  v o t e r s  and a f e a s i b l e  p '  such t h a t  p i  = pi f o r  a l l  
- 
i $ C ,  C c f ( p t ) ,  and e i t h e r  
- 
(ii) c n s *  = 6 . 
L e t t i n g  S '  = f ( p ' )  we have ,  f o r  any  member s o  E S o ,  
- 
Thus,  
( 9  p ( s O )  = p ( S ' )  and p j  = pp f o r  a l l  ~ E C - S o  and a l l  so  E S o ,  
from which it f o l l o w s  t h a t  p j  = p; f o r  a l l  i $ N O  and p '  s a t i s f i e s  
( 4 ) .  Hence p '  and p d i f f e r  o n l y  o n  t h e  set  C ~ N ' .  T h e r e f o r e  by 
- 
(9), 
so ? '  s a t i s f i e s  (5) a l s o .  F i n a l l y ,  it i s  c l e a r  t h a t  C n S *  = @ 
( c a s e  (ii) above)  c a n n o t  h o l d ,  s i n c e  t h e n  p '  - = p .  Hence by t h e  
above remarks  and (i) we have 
and 
c o n t r a d i c t i n g  t h e  c h o i c e  o f  p .  
I n  t h e  p roof  o f  t h e  c o n v e r s e  above we saw t h a t  i f  we choose 
any  payment s c h e d u l e  f  such  t h a t  f ( p )  E S O ,  t h e n  p is  a  c a n o n i c a l  
- 
e q u i l i b r i u m  f o r  t h i s  f .  BY t h i s  and ( 7 )  we have t h e  f o l l o w i n g .  
C o r o l l a r y  I .  A c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  P i s  a  c a n o n i c a l  e q u i -  
l i b r i u m  f o r  f  i f  and o n l y  i f  f ( g )  E S o .  
R e f e r r i n g  t o  Example 1 ,  we s e e  t h a t  p l a y e r s  1  and 2  a r e  
t h e  o n l y  o n e s  who c o u l d  be  above t h e i r  f l o o r  p r i c e s  i n  a  c a n o n i c a l  
e q u i l i b r i u m .  Moreover,  among a l l  p o f  form (p l  , p 2 ,  1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 )  such  
t h a t  p l  + p2 i s  t h e  minimum c o s t  o f  a  winning s e t ,  p l  + p2 = 5 i s  
maximum; hence by t h e  C o r o l l a r y ,  ( 3 , 2 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 )  i s  a  c a n o n i c a l  
e q u i l i b r i u m  f o r  t h e  f  d e f i n e d  e a r l i e r ,  and i n  f a c t  it is  t h e  o n l y  
one.  
Lemma 2 .  I f  p  is  a  c o l l e c t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  f o r  f  t h e n  6 i s  a  
- 
c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  f o r  f ,  where ei = pp f o r  i (  £ ( P I ,  Ci = P i  f o r  
i E f  ( p )  . 
- 
A 
P r o o f .  L e t  p ,  p  be  a s  above ,  and l e t  f ( p )  = S*. Suppose 
- - - 
t h a t  f o r  some S  E S ,  ;(s) < C ( S * )  , and w e  w i l l  d e r i v e  a  c o n t r a -  
- - 
d i c t i o n .  
L e t  2 = {S E S:;(S) = m i n = a )  and f o r  e a c h  S E  3 l e t  C = S  
{ i E  S -  S* : p i >  p i ) .  Then CS f 4 .  L e t  CT b e  a  minimal  e lement  of  
t h e  f a m i l y  { C s : S ~  2 1 ,  and d e f i n e  q by 
E v i d e n t l y ,  g (T) = @ ( T )  = a, and s i n c e  q  - 2 6, a = q (T) = 
min q (S)  . I f  T '  is  any winning  s e t  s u c h  t h a t  q  ( T I )  = a, t h e n  
- 
SES A 
q  L - p  i m p l i e s  G ( T ' )  = a ,  i . e .  T '  E 3 and CT,C CT.  By c h o i c e  o f  
- - - 
CT,  C T ,  = CT and s o  C T C T 8 .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  C T C f ( q ) .  But t h e n  
under  q ,  e v e r y  p l a y e r  i E C T  g e t s  a  payof f  o f  p p  > 0 whereas  i 
- 
g o t  n o t h i n g  under  p .  S i n c e  i n  g o i n g  from p t o  o n l y  t h e  members 
- 
o f  CT changed p r i c e s ,  t h i s  c o n t r a d i c t s  t h e  assumpt ion  t h a t  p  i s  
- 
a  c o l l e c t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m .  
There f  o r e  
S* min imizes  6 (s)  o v e r  a l l  S  E S.  
Then, a s  i n  t h e  d e r i v a t i o n  o f  (7), we c o n c l u d e  t h a t  
(11)  s*ESO and Gi > Pi i m p l i e s  i~ n S  = N o  . 
SES O 
I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  s a t i s f i e s  ( 4 )  and  ( 5 )  o f  Lemma 1 .  T h e r e f o r e ,  i f  
- 
6 is  n o t  a  c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  t h e r e  must e x i s t  a  f e a s i b l e  r ,  
- 
- 
d i f f e r i n g  from 6 o n l y  on N o  and s u c h  t h a t  
- 
(12)  e v e r y  S E S O  minimizes  r ( S )  and 1 r . >  1 Gi = 1 pi . 
- 
~ E N O  i ~ d  i ~ g  
By s u b t r a c t i n g  o f f  a  s m a l l  E > 0 from e v e r y  r .  i E N r  = { i  E N O  : 
1' 
r > p i ) ,  we s e e  t h a t  r c a n  a c t u a l l y  b e  chosen  s o  t h a t  it i s  f e a s i b l e ,  i - 
( 1  2 )  h o l d s ,  and e v e r y  S  E S  min imiz ing  r ( S )  c o n t a i n s  N r ,  t h a t  i s  
- 
(13)  S  E S  min imizes  r ( S )  - i f  and o n l y  i f  S  E S o  . 
Now d e f i n e  9 such  t h a t  q i  = ri f o r  i E N o ,  qi = pi f o r  i p! N O .  
For  any S  E S, q ( S )  2 r ( S )  w h i l e  q ( S * )  = r ( S * ) ;  hence f o r  = f  ( q )  
- - - 
w e  have 5 (3) q (3) 5 q (S*)  = r (S*)  , imply ing  t h a t  3 minimizes  
- 
r(S), hence contains N O .  But N O  is better off under q than under 
- - 
?, a contradiction. Hence is a canonical equilibrium. 
- 
Lemma 2 shows that any non-canonical collective equilibrium 
is just an inessential variant of some canonical equilibrium, and 
Lemma 1 tells us how to recognize the latter. The problem is then 
to determine when a canonical equilibrium exists. 
Clearly one situation in which it cannot exist is if the 
voting game contains a veto player, for the price of any such 
player can increase without bound, and there will be no finite 
maximum in ( 6 ) .  It turns out that this is the only exception: 
if there are no veto players then the game always has a collec- 
tive equilibrium. 
To see this, consider condition (5) of Lemma 1: 
?(so) 2 p(S) for all S E S  and s O a S  
is equivalent to 
which in view of (4) is the same as 
1, (pi - PP) 2 e0 (s) - ?O (SO) for all s E s . iEN -S 
I£ N O  = @ ,  Lemma 1 implies is the unique canonical equi- 
librium. Otherwise, let A be the (0,l)-incidence matrix whose 
- 
columns are indexed by the players i~ No, and whose rows are in- 
dexed by the distinct, nonempty sets N O  - S, S E  S. For each row 
index T = No - S let bT = ?O (S) - ?O (so) (this is independent of 
SO), and let b be the column vector of such bT's. Finally, let 
- 
.rr be ? - p 0  restricted to the components i EN'. Then (14) is equi 
- 
valent to 
A v e c t o r  p  s a t i s f i e s  ( 4 )  and ( 5 )  o f  Lemma 1  i f  and o n l y  i f  it 
- 
i s  o b t a i n e d  from such  a  n  by l e t t i n g  pi = R~ + P: f o r  i E N O ,  pi= p p  f o r  
- 
i $ ~ ' .  T h e r e f o r e ,  by Lemma 1 ,  t h e  s e t  o f  a l l  c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i a  
f o r  a  g i v e n  p D  i s  o b t a i n e d  a s  t h e  s e t  o f  t h e  p ' s  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  
- - 
t o  t h e  o p t i m a l  s o l u t i o n s  o f  t h e  l i n e a r  program 
max 1 n 
( 1 6 )  - - 
A ' T ( b ,  - - -  Ill0 . 
The d u a l  of ( 1 6 )  i s  
min b . y 
- 
y e '  1, y 2 0  - 
I f  A h a s  no z e r o  columns,  i . e .  i f  t h e r e  a r e  no v e t o  p l a y e r s ,  
- 
t h e n  y  = 1  is a  f e a s i b l e  s o l u t i o n  t o  ( 1 7 ) .  S i n c e  b  2 0 ,  n = 0  i s  
- - 
-- 
- - - 
always a  f e a s i b l e  s o l u t i o n  t o  ( 1 6 ) ,  and we o b t a i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g .  
Theorem I .  For. any  v o t i n g  game w i t h o u t  v e t o  p 2 a y e r s  and 
f l o o r  p r i c e s  p D  - > 0  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r ~ i u m  p ,  - 
and i n  g e n e r a 2  p i s  u n i q u e  
- 
ExampZe 2 .  C o n s i d e r  t h e  v o t i n g  game on e l e v e n  p l a y e r s  
{ 1 , 2 ,  ... , l l )  g i v e n  by t h e  minimal winning s e t s :  
where f o r  e a c h  k ,  Tk r a n g e s  o v e r  a l l  k - s u b s e t s  o f  { 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 1 0 , 1 1 ) .  
Take go = 1; t h e n  { 1 , 2 , 3 )  = N O  i s  t h e  un ique  c r i t i c a l  s e t .  
The l i n e a r  program ( 1 6 )  is  
max n l + ~ 2 + n  3  
s u b j e c t  t o  n 1 , n 2 , n  > 0 and 3  = 
Here t h e  f i r s t  row is  o b t a i n e d  f rom (14)  by s e t t i n g  S = { 2 , 3 ) ~ ~ ~  
f o r  some T5, and s o  f o r t h .  The u n i q u e  o p t i m a l  s o l u t i o n  i s  7 = 
- 
( 3  ? , 2  1 , ;  ) , s o  t h e  u n i q u e  c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  is  
- p  = (41 2 ,  3! 2 r ~ l r l r l r l r l r l r l , l r l ) .  
- 
POWER AND INCOME 
The power o f  a  p l a y e r  i n  a  v o t i n g  game is  c l e a r l y  r e l a t e d  t o  
h i s  p r i c e ,  b u t  a s  we have s e e n ,  some p l a y e r s  may c h a r g e  h i g h  p r i c e s  
and g e t  n o t h i n g .  The u l t i m a t e  t e s t  i s  n o t  what  t h e  p l a y e r  a s k s  
b u t  what  h e  g e t s .  Given any payment s c h e d u l e  f  and  p r i c e s  p  we 
w 
d e f i n e  t h e  i n c o m e  o f  p l a y e r  i t o  b e  
F o r  a  n o n - c a n o n i c a l  c o l l e c t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  t h e  income t o  e a c h  
p l a y e r  is t h e  same a s  f o r  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  
and i n  a n y  e v e n t  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a  n o n - c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  
is i m p r o b a b l e  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  problem.  Hence we assume 
t h a t ,  g i v e n  any payment s c h e d u l e  f ,  t h e  p l a y e r s  w i l l  a r r i v e  a t  
some c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e s  p - f o r  f, and any s u c h  p a i r  
( p , f )  w i l l  b e  c a l l e d  a n  e q u i l i b r i u m  p a i r .  
- 
L e t  G = (N,S) b e  any v o t i n g  game w i t h o u t  v e t o  p l a y e r s .  F o r  
comput ing t h e  r e l a t i v e  power o f  t h e  p l a y e r s  we assume t h a t ,  a  
p r i o r i ,  t h e r e  i s  no d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e i r  minimum p r i c e s ,  t h a t  i s  
p; = pi = ... = p: = u > O  f o r  some c o n s t a n t  a .  ( L a t e r  w e  w i l l  
c o n s i d e r  o t h e r  p o s s i b i l i t i e s . )  I t  i s  e a s y  t o  see t h a t  p i s  a  ca -  
n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  f o r  p o  i f  and  o n l y  i f  up i s  a  c a n o n i c a l  e q u i -  
- - 
l i b r i u m  f o r  a p o ( a >  0 ) ;  hence  t h e  c h o i c e  o f  u  i s  i m m a t e r i a l .  
W e  d e f i n e  t h e  p a s s i n g  income ( o r  p a s s i n g  power)  o f  p l a y e r  i ,  
Q i ,  t o  b e  h i s  e x p e c t e d  income o v e r  a l l  e q u i l i b r i u m  p a i r s  ( p , f )  
[wi th  p o  a s  a b o v e ) ,  n o r m a l i z e d  s o  t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  power i s  1 .  
I f  ( p , f )  i s  a n  e q u i l i b r i u m  p a i r  t h e n  f  ( p )  E S O ,  a n d  f o r  any 
- - 
payment s c h e d u l e  g  which s a t i s f i e s  g  ( p )  t S D ,  ( p , g )  i s  a l s o  an  
e q u i l i b r i u m  p a i r .  T h e r e f o r e  i f  ( a s  i s  n o r m a l l y  t h e  c a s e )  P i s  
u n i q u e ,  t h e n  l e t t i n g  s o  = ~ s O I ,  sp = ~ { S E  S O : i E  S}l we have  
I f  t h e r e  i s  more t h a n  one  c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  t h e n  t h e  
set P o f  a l l  o f  them fo rms  a  convex se t ,  and  t h e  p  o f  f o r m u l a  ( 1 7 )  
- 
i s  t a k e n  t o  b e  t h e  c e n t . r o i d  o f  P.  
- 
Example 3 (The U.S. F e d e r a l  Game). The members o f  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  and  t h e  S e n a t e ,  t o g e t h e r  
w i t h  t h e  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t  and t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  a r e  p l a y e r s  i n  t h e  
v o t i n g  game G d e s c r i b e d  s c h e m a t i c a l l y  by t h e  minimal  w i n n i n g  
sets o f  t y p e :  
{218R150S,V,P}, {218R,51S1P} a n d  { 2 9 0 ~ , 6 7 ~ ) ,  
where R,S,V,P h a s  t h e  obv ious  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  The un ique  e q u i -  
l i b r i u m  p a s s i n g  p r i c e s  f o r  p 0  = 1  a r e  found by i n s p e c t i o n  t o  b e  
- - 
- 88.  T h i s  s o l u t i o n  can  a l s o  be P R =  1 ,  PS = 1 ,  p v =  1 ,  Pp - 
a r r i v e d  a t  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  h e u r i s t i c  r e a s o n i n g .  A t  t h e i r  f l o o r  
p r i c e s ,  none o f  R,  S ,  and V i s  c r i t i c a l - - t h a t  i s ,  t h e  l o b b y i s t  
can a lways b r i b e  a t  no e x t r a  c o s t  a  s e t  e x c l u d i n g  any such  p l a y e r  
--and hence t h e y  w i l l  never  have an  i n c e n t i v e  t o  c h a r g e  more. The 
P r e s i d e n t ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand,  w i l l  c h a r g e  j u s t  enough s o  t h a t  t h e  
l o b b y i s t  i s  i n d i f f e r e n t  between b r i b i n g  him and b r i b i n g  some sub- 
s t i t u t e  s e t  o f  p l a y e r s .  The l e a s t  number o f  p l a y e r s  t h a t  can  be 
s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  88 ;  hence h i s  p r i c e .  T h i s  i l l u s -  
t r a t e s  a  g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  w i l l  b e  e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r  we igh ted  
v o t i n g  games i n  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n .  
A s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  any v o t i n g  game G = (N,S) i s  t h e  c o m p l e m e n t a r y  
game G = ( N , S ) ,  d e f i n e d  by S  € 3  i f  and o n l y  i f  N -  S $ S .  I n  G a  
winning c o a l i t i o n  i s  one t h a t  i s  a b l e  t o  p a s s  a  measure  whereas  
i n  F a  winn ing  c o a l i t i o n  i s  one t h a t  i s  a b l e  t o  b l o c k  a  measure .  
I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e s  f o r  G and G w i l l  be 
d i f f e r e n t .  
For  t h e  U.S. F e d e r a l  c a s e  t h e  complementary game i s  d e s c r i b e d  
by t h e  minimal winning s e t s :  
The unique c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e s  a r e  s e e n  t o  be  
pR = ps = pv = 1 ,  pp = 17.  
- 
The b l o c k i n g  income ( o r  b l o c k i n g  p o w e r ) ,  o f  p l a y e r  i i s  
d e f i n e d  t o  b e  h i s  p a s s i n g  income r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  game G. The 
d i s t i n c t i o n  between b l o c k i n g  and p a s s i n g  incomes i s  a  v a l u a b l e  
one. However, f o r  comparison w i t h  t h e  Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik 
i n d i c e s ,  it i s  u s e f u l  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  p l a y e r s '  e x p e c t e d  income 
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  p a s s i n g  a n d  b l o c k i n g  t o g e t h e r .  D e f i n e  t h e  income 
( o r  ~ J C L ~ C I ~ )  o f  p l a y e r  i ,  'Pi, t o  b e  h i s  t o t a l  e x p e c t e d  income ( re la-  
t i v e  t o  p o  = I), n o r m a l i z e d  s o  t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  i s  1 :  
- 
where  p ,  6 a r e  t h e  c e n t r o i d  c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i a  f o r  G a n d  G re- 
- - 
s p e c t i v e l y  a n d  s o ,  so, e t c . ,  h a v e  t h e  o b v i o u s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  
The p a s s i n g  a n d  b l o c k i n g  incomes  f o r  t h e  U.S. F e d e r a l  Game 
are g i v e n  i n  T a b l e  1 ,  a n d  t h e  i ncomes  are compared  w i t h  t h e  
S h a p l e y - S h u b i k  and  Banzhaf  v a l u e s  i n  T a b l e  2 .  
T a b l e  1 .  Incomes  f o r  t h e  U.S. F e d e r a l  G a m e .  
P l a y e r  P a s s i n g  Income 
B l o c k i n g  
Income 
T a b l e  2 .  Power M e a s u r e s  f o r  t h e  U.S. F e d e r a l  Game. 
P l a y e r  Income Banzha f  S h a p l e y - S h u b i k  V a l u e  Va lue  
For  a  p r i o r i  computa t ions  o f  power it was assumed t h a t  t h e  
f l o o r  p r i c e s  o f  a l l  p l a y e r s  were  e q u a l .  T h i s  i s  i n  keep ing  w i t h  
t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  a  f l o o r  p r i c e  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  minimum payment com- 
m e n s u r a t e  w i t h  t h e  a c t  o f  a c c e p t i n g  a  b r i b e  a t  a l l ,  which a  p r i o r i  
i s  n o t  d i f f e r e n t  f o r  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  p l a y e r s .  Another  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
i s  t h a t  t h e  f l o o r  p r i c e  r e p r e s e n t s  some k i n d  o f  minimum e x p e c t a t i o n ;  
it  c o u l d  t h e n  b e  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  more power fu l  p l a y e r s  w i l l  n a t u -  
r a l l y  have  h i g h e r  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  and t h e r e f o r e  h i g h e r  f l o o r  p r i c e s .  
I f  we f o l l o w  t h i s  i d e a  t o  i t s  c o n c l u s i o n ,  we might  i n d e e d  a s s e r t  
t h a t  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e s ,  once  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  become t h e  new f l o o r  
p r i c e s .  Does t h i s  l e a d  t o  a  k i n d  o f  " second  o r d e r "  e q u i l i b r i u m ?  
The answer  i s  e a s i l y  s e e n  t o  b e  no ,  s i n c e  i f  p  i s  a  c o l l e c t i v e  
- 
e q u i l i b r i u m  f o r  i n i t i a l  f l o o r  p r i c e s  p o l  t h e n  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e r e  
- 
i s  no  p l a y e r  c o n t a i n e d  i n  T\S , s i n c e  any such  p l a y e r  c o u l d  
p (S)=min 
r a i s e  h i s  p r i c e  f u r t h e r .  T h e r e f o r e  i f  p i s  t a k e n  t o  be  t h e  new 
f l o o r  p r i c e s ,  t h e n  t h e r e  a r e  no c r i t i c a l  p l a y e r s ;  hence t h e  f l o o r  
p r i c e s  t h e m s e l v e s  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  un ique  c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m .  
T h e r e f o r e  no new e q u i l i b r i a  a r e  o b t a i n e d .  
WEIGHTED V O T I N G  GAMES 
A v o t i n g  game G = ( N , S ) ,  N = { 1 , 2 ,  ..., n } ,  i s  r e p r e s e n t a b l e  a s  
a  we igh ted  v o t i n g  game i f  t h e r e  a r e  numbers q ;  w 1 , w 2 ,  ..., wn such  
t h a t  S E  S  i f  and o n l y  i f  1 wi'q. q  i s  c a l l e d  t h e  q u o t a ,  t h e  w i l s  
i c  S 
a r e  c a l l e d  t h e  w e i g h t s .  
Example 4 .  The County o f  Nassau i n  New York S t a t e  h a s  a  County 
Board o f  S u p e r v i s o r s  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  s i x  members, o n e  f o r  e a c h  munic- 
i p a l i t y  i n  t h e  County.  A s  of  1971 t h e  members' v o t e s  were  we igh ted  
a s  shown i n  T a b l e  3 w i t h  a  m a j o r i t y  o f  6 3  o f  115 r e q u i r e d  t o  p a s s  
a  measure .  
-20- 
Table 3. Weights for the Nassau County Board of Supervisors (1971 ) .  
Municipality Weight 
Hempstead No. 1 (HI) 3 1 
Hempstead No. 2 (H2) 3 1 
Oyster Bay (OB) 2 8 
North Hempstead (NH) 2 1 
Glen Cove (GC) 2 
Long Beach (LB) 2 
For equal floor prices, p a  = 1, the critical sets are 
- - 
Since no player is critical, p a  = 1 is the unique canonical 
equilibrium. For the complementary game 53 votes are required to 
block, and for = 1 the critical sets are {HI, ~ 2 } ,  {HI, OB}, 
- 
and [H2, OBI . Again, no player is critical. The resulting ex- 
pected incomes (normalized) are compared in Table 4 with the 
Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik values. 
Table 4. Power Measures for the Nassau County Board of Supervisors. 
Municipality -- Income Banzhaf Value Shapley-Shubik Value 
H I .3oo .27a .2a3 
H 2 .3oo .27a .2a3 
OB .233 .204 .217 
NH .I00 . 130 .I17 
GC .03 3 .056 .050 
LB .033 .05 6 .050 
In the U.S. Federal Game we noticed that the price of the 
President can be interpreted as a kind of marginal rate of sub- 
stitution of other players for the President. In the above example 
the prices also have this interpretation. More precisely, given 
any voting game G = (N,S) without veto players, and p0 = 1, define 
- - 
vi, for each i EN, to be the cardinality of the smallest winning 
set not containing i, and similarly define ui to be the cardinality 
of the smallest winning set containing i. We call r. = v. - ui+l 
the i n t e g r a l  s u b s t i t u t i o n  r a t e  for i. Notice that in Examples 3 and 
4 the canonical equilibrium prices eaual the integral substitution 
rates or 1 ,  whichever is larger. Althouqh this result does not hold 
for all voting games, it is "approximately" true for all weighted 
voting games (in the sense of Theorem 2 below); moreover it often 
holds in practice-- e.g. the U.S. Federal Game, which is not renresen- 
table as a weighted voting game. 
Theorem 2 .  Le t  G be a  w e i g h t e d  v o t i n g  game w i t h  p l a y e r  s e t  
{1,2,...,n} = N and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  (q;w .,, w2, ..., wn) where 
w l L  w2L ...? W and f wi)q. L e t  p0 = 1. n i=2 
(i) For e v e r y  c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u r n  p e i t h e r  p. = 1 o r  
- 
pi > 1 and ri - 1 5 pi ( r. 1' 
(ii) T h e r e  e x i s t s  some c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  5 s u c h  t h a t  
- 
- - 
PI 2 P2'...'Pn. 
\ 
P r o o f .  By the hypotheses that wl 2 w2, ..., wn and 1 wi'q, 
i=2 
G has no veto players. With p0 = 1, let No be the set of critical 
- - 
players, p - a canonical equilibrium price vector, and n j  = p j  - p;, 
j E No. TO prove (i) it suffices to show that r . - 2 5 n .  < r . - 1 for 3 ] = I  
any j E No. Let S O  be any critical set (i.e. minimum cardinality 
winning set). For each j E No, let S' be a minimum cardinality set 
in S n o t  containing j. Then the (No- SI )-row of the linear program 
(16) states that 
so n j 0 implies 
We note that (19) holds for any voting game G without veto 
players. With G as hypothesized we now show that 
r - 2  2 I T .  for all j € N 0  . j I 
Let k be the least integer such that q 2 wi. Then 
1 LlLk 
S O  = { 1 , 2 ,  ..., k3 is a minimum cardinality winning-set. For any 
cCN', C # $, such that N -  C E S ,  let r be the least integer II C 
such that q 2 1 w + 1 wi. Then rC = IS1 - Is0 - C I  
Ili~k k+ 1 zi$k+ll 
i$C 
where S is a minimum cardinality winning set such that S n C  = $. 
Evidently r = ri for all i E SO. 
We claim that whenever rC is defined and I c I  2 2, 
rc 2 rc-{j} + r . - 1 for every ~ E C .  { I }  
By definition, 
and 
hence subtracting (21) from (22), 
Letting II = rC - r C-{j) + 1 it follows from the fact that the wils 
are nonincreasing that 
Hence 
(2  3 )  
and 
proving (20). 
Now fix j E N'C SO. 
If y is a dual optimal solution to (171, then y A L 1  implies 
- 
that for any given j EN' there exists an S * E  S such that 
j EC* = N O  - S* and yC, > 0; hence by complementary slackness 
On the other hand, for any S E  S such that S n C *  = @ we have 
(by the feasibility of TI) 
- 
hence S* is a minimum cardinality S E  S such that S n C *  = @ ,  
whence 
and 
If C* = { j 1 ,  then we have n . = r - 1 and we are done. 
I Cj} 
If {j}$c*, then TI - feasible implies 
2 ( s I  - ]sol for all S E  S S-t. S n(c* - {j)) = @ , 
iEC*-{ j} 
in particular, 
From (20), (25) and (26) it follows that 
and since j was arbitrary in NO, statement (i) is proved. 
Now suppose there is no monotone canonical equilibrium p in 
- 
t h e  s e n s e  o f  s t a t e m e n t  (ii) o f  t h e  theorem. For  any c a n o n i c a l  
e q u i l i b r i u m  p  a  p a i r  ( i ,  j )  i s  bad i f  i < j  and pi < p j .  L e t  
- 
be a  c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  having t h e  s m a l l e s t  number o f  bad p a i r s .  
- - - - 
We may choose i and j  such  t h a t  i < j ,  pi < p j ,  and ph 2 P j  f o r  
- 
h  5 i -1 ,  < 6 .  f o r  k  2 j + l .  P k =  1 
L e t  E = (p. - p . ) / 2  and d e f i n e  
1 1  
- 
PJ = P j  - 
- PC = pk f o r  k  # i , j  - 
We c l a i m  t h a t  p* h a s  fewer  bad p a i r s  t h a n  p. I n d e e d ,  p* can 
- 
i n t r o d u c e  no new bad p a i r  ( i , h )  where i < h.  On t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  
- - - 
i f  h  < i t h e n  by c h o i c e  of ( i , j )  ph 2 pj = pi + 2 ~ ,  s o  p i  = 
- 
Ph > 
pi + E = p +  and ( h , i )  i s  n o t  a  bad p a i r  f o r  p* .  S i m i l a r l y  w e  show 
t h a t p *  i n t r o d u c e s  no new bad p a i r s  i n v o l v i n g  j .  S i n c e  ( i , j )  i s  
- 
n o t  a  bad p a i r  f o r  p*,  p *  h a s  s t r i c t l y  fewer  bad p a i r s  t h a n  p. 
- - 
- - 
L e t  rk = pk - 1  f o r  ~ E N O ;  t h e n  i s  o p t i m a l  f o r  ( 1 6 ) .  Moreover, 
7 
- - 
s i n c e  a .  > r i  2 1 ,  we must have j  E N ' .  We c l a i m  t h a t  r *  i s  f e a s i b l e  
I  
f o r  ( 1 6 ) ,  where r *  = p* - 1  f o r  k e  N o .  k k  
Indeed ,  f o r  f i x e d  S O  E S o  and any S  E S  such t h a t  N O  - S f $I, 
u n l e s s  i E N o  - S  and j $ N o  - S; t h a t  i s ,  u n l e s s  j  E S  and i $ S. I n  
t h i s  c a s e ,  s i n c e  w .  > w. it f o l l o w s  t h a t  S '  = S u { i I  - { j I E S .  
1 = 3 '  




- - 1 % =  1 nk + T I .  - 1. = 1 Tk + zc 5 (st I - Iso\ = Is1 - Is0 1 
~ E N O - S  ' ~ E N O - S  I 1 ~ENO-.S 
and so 
- 1 TI*  = 1 n k + E  < ( s J  - lsOl I 
~ E N O - s  ~ E N O - s  
showing that ( 2 7 )  holds in any case. Thus n* is feasible, and 
- 
- 
since 1 . TI*  = 1 T I ,  n* is also optimal; hence by Lemma 1 p* is a 
- - - - -  
canonical equilibrium with fewer bad pairs than p, a contradiction.~ 
- 
Example 5. Let G be the weighted voting game with represen- 
tation w = ( 1 2 , 6 , 5 , 4 , 4 , 4 , 4 , 1 ,  I ) ,  q = 23. With = 1 the unique 
- - - 
critical set consists of the first three players. The associated 
linear program is 
max n l  + n 2  + n  3  
subject to n 1 , n 2 , n 3  2 0 and 
1  Then TI = ( 2 , 0 , 1 )  is an optimal solution that is non-monotone 
* 
in the players' weights. Moreover it may be observed that there is 
no alternate representation of the game by different weights in 
which player 3  has a weight equal to or greater than that of player 
2, because players { 2 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 )  constitute a winning set, whereas 
{ 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 1  d o  n o t .  
The v o t i n g  game o f  Example 2 may a c t u a l l y  b e  r e p r e s e n t e d  a s  
a  w e i g h t e d  v o t i n g  game w i t h  w e i g h t s  w = ( 1 3 , 1 0 , 4 , 3 , 3 , 3 , 3 , 3 , 3 , 3 , 3 )  
- 
a n d  q u o t a  q  = 27.  As shown b e f o r e ,  f o r  p a  = 1  t h e  u n i q u e  c a n o n i c a l  
- - 
e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e s  a r e  ( 4 ~ , 3 ~ , 1 ~ , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1  , 1 )  , which s a t i s f y  
t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  Theorem 2 b u t  a r e  n o t  i n t e g e r .  
INCORRUPTIBLES 
So f a r  it  h a s  been  assumed t h a t  e v e r y  p l a y e r ' s  v o t e  c a n  b e  
b o u g h t ,  a n d ,  moreove r ,  t h a t  e a c h  p l a y e r  t h r e a t e n s  t o  v o t e  c o n t r a r y  
t o  t h e  l o b b v i s t ' s  w i s h e s  u n l e s s  h e  i s  b r i b e d .  The more g e n e r a l  
v i e w p o i n t  may b e  a d o p t e d  t h a t  f o r  any i s s u e  which  t h e  l o b b y i s t  
s u p p o r t s  t h e r e  w i l l  b e  a  c e r t a i n  s u b s e t  o f  p l a y e r s  who s u p p o r t  
t h e  measu re  and  t h e r e f o r e  d o  n o t  need  t o  b e  b r i b e d ,  whereas  t h e r e  
a r e  o t h e r  p l a y e r s  who c a n n o t  b e  b o u g h t  a t  any  p r i c e  ( i n c o r r u p t i b 1 , e . s ) .  
T h i s  s i t u a t i o n  c a n  b e  h a n d l e d  by a  s i m p l e  m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  f o r e -  
g o i n g  i d e a s .  Given game G = (N,S) w e  assume t h a t  b e f o r e  b r i b i n g  
b e g i n s ,  a  c e r t a i n  se t  A L N  of  p l a y e r s  announce  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  i n  
f a v o r ,  t h a t  a n o t h e r  se t  B G N - A  o f  p l a y e r s  a r e  i r r e v o c a b l y  o p p o s e d ,  
and  t h a t  t h e  r e m a i n d e r ,  N - (AUB), a r e  m e r e l y  w a i t i n g  t o  b e  b r i b e d .  
I n  e f f e c t ,  t h e  p l a y e r s  i n  A  v o l u n t a r i l y  a c c e p t  a  b r i b e  p r i c e  o f  0 ,  
w h i l e  t h o s e  i r r e v o c a b l y  opposed  have  a  f l o o r  p r i c e  o f  + m .  If A  w i n s ,  
o r  i f  N - B  l o s e s ,  t h e n  t h e  l o b b y i s t  h a s  n o t h i n g  t o  do .  O t h e r w i s e ,  
t h e  l o b b y i s t  b e h a v e s  a s  i f  t h e  game were 
where  S '  = {S G  ( N  - (A U B) ) :S U A  E S )  and  p r i c e s  a n d  incomes  a r e  
d e t e r m i n e d  a c c o r d i n g l y .  
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